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Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp.
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 19751 has caused a
significant increase in the admissibility of expert testimony. 2 In determining
admissibility, courts typically consider only the qualifications of a witness3 and
whether the data used by the expert is of a type reasonably relied upon by other
experts in the field.4 Thus, as a general rule, questions regarding the reliability
or scientific bases of an expert's opinion affect weight rather than admissibility
and are left for the jury's consideration. 5 However, there is a growing debate
over this deference to the jury, with some courts advocating stricter judicial
scrutiny.6 A recent Fifth Circuit decision, Christophersen v. Allied-Signal
Corp.,7 exemplifies the trend towards greater judicial control.
In 1986, Albert Christophersen died as a result of a rare form of metastatic
colon cancer.8 Christophersen had worked for fourteen years for Marathon
Manufacturing Company, which produces nickel/cadmium batteries. 9 Although
Christophersen was not directly involved in the production of the batteries, he
was allegedly exposed to the resulting fumes. 10 Christophersen's wife and child
brought suit pursuant to the Texas Wrongful Death and Survival Statute"
against Marathon and a number of companies that supplied Marathon with
materials. 12 The complaint alleged that the products used were defectively
1 Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. app. (1988)).
2 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's notes (Prelim. Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence,
August 1991).
3 FED. R. EVID. 702.
4 FED. R. EVID. 703; see also L.L. Plotkin, Note, Brock v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: What is the Court's Role in Expert Testimony?, 64 TuL. L. REV.
1263, 1264 (1990).
5 Dixon v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1985).
6 David Bernstein, Out of the Fryeing Pan and into the Fire: The Expert Witness
Problem in Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REv. LMG., Fall 1990, at 117, 127-28.
7 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en bane) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280
(1992).
8 Id. at 1108.
9Id.
10 Id.
I ITEX. CIVILPRACrCE & REMEDIES CODE ANN. §§ 71.001-.031 (West 1986).
12 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1108 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
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designed, manufactured, and marketed, and as a result, caused
Christophersen's cancer and subsequent death. 13
Marathon moved for summary judgment, and the district court determined
that plaintiffs failed to state a design or manufacturing defect. 14 Plaintiffs did
not appeal this ruling. However, the district court also granted Marathon's
motion for summary judgment on the marketing defect claim because there was
insufficient evidence of causation. 15 Plaintiffs relied on an expert witness who
concluded that Christophersen's exposure to nickel and cadmium caused his
cancer and death. 16 The district court reviewed the basis for the expert's
conclusion and determined that this testimony should be excluded because it
was unreliable, and in the alternative, the expert's testimony would have been
more prejudicial than probative. 17 On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit
reversed, holding that the expert's conclusions "were not so fundamentally
unsupported that they would be of no assistance to the jury" and the "questions
concerning the bases for the conclusions and issues [should be] considered by
the jury ... and do not render the opinion unreliable and therefore
inadmissible."' 8
The defendants petitioned for rehearing en banc. The Fifth Circuit granted
the petition 19 and affirmed the district court opinion.20 The court held that the
district court could look beyond the qualifications of an expert in determining
the admissibility of expert testimony.21 The court utilized a four-part test in that
determination:
(1) Whether the witness is qualified to express an expert opinion, Fed. R.
Evid. 702;
(2) whether the facts upon which the expert relies are the same type as are
relied upon by other experts in the field, Fed. R. Evid. 703;
(3) whether in reaching his conclusion the expert used a well-founded
methodology, Frye v. United States;22 and
(4) assuming the expert's testimony has passed the first three tests, whether the
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1109.
15 Id.16 Id.
17 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 902 F.2d 362, 364 n.2 (5th Cir.), reh'g
granted, 914 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'dper curimn, 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
18 Id. at 367.
19 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 914 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1990).
20 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1114 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
bane) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
21 Id.
22 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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testimony's potential for prejudice substantially outweighs its probative
value. 23
The majority opinion concluded that the expert's testimony did not pass either
the Rule 703 or Frye prongs of this test;24 hence, the district court's ruling that
the testimony was inadmissible was not "manifestly erroneous."25 The United
States Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari on March 2, 1992.26
Christophersen illustrates the movement towards strict judicial scrutiny in
the controversy over the admissibility of expert testimony. The most
troublesome question of this debate is whether the court should limit the
admissibility of an expert opinion because the court deems the expert
unreliable-or is this an issue better left to the jury? This Comment will focus
on that issue first by considering the traditional standards for admissibility of
expert testimony; second, by examining the history of the Fifth Circuit in
resolving this issue; third, by analyzing the Christophersen decision in regard
to traditional standards of admissibility and precedent; and fourth, by
considering other attempts to limit expert testimony and the policy behind this
trend.
II. TRADITIONAL FACTORS IN THE DETERMINATION OF ADMISSIBILITY
OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. The Frye Test
A special rule for the admissibility of scientific evidence came from the
D.C. Circuit's 1923 decision in Frye v. United States.27 The appellant in this
case had been convicted of murder and sought to introduce evidence that he had
passed a "systolic blood pressure deception test." 28 The court rejected the
evidence and set forth a standard of admissibility that requires the process or
theory upon which the evidence is based to be "sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs." 29 This
rule differs from a relevancy approach in which any relevant conclusions by a
qualified expert would be admissible.30 The Frye rule imposes the additional
23 Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1110.2 4 Id. at 1113-16.
25 d. at 1116.
26 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
27 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see 1 JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 203, at 869 (4th ed. 1992).2 8 Frye, 293 F. at 1013; see also Bert Black, A Unified Tthory of Scientific Evidence,
56 FoRDHAM L. REv. 595, 629 (1988).2 9 Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
30 STRONG, supra note 27, § 203, at 868-69.
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burden of general acceptance in the scientific community as a condition of
admissibility. 31
The status of the Frye rule has been uncertain, particularly after the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 32 The Frye general acceptance
standard is not mentioned in Rule 702 or the Advisory Committee's note, and
the rule seems to take a relevancy approach. 33 However, because the Frye test
is not specifically mentioned, its status is uncertain, with commentators taking
varying viewpoints. Some argue that the omission is "tantamount to the
abandonment of the general acceptance standard," 34 while others argue that
because the Federal Rules do not expressly overrule Frye, the general
acceptance standard remains intact.35 The status of the Frye test also remains
unclear in the federal circuit courts. 36
The August 1991 preliminary draft of the proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Evidence provides a bit of much needed guidance on this
issue. In the proposed change to Rule 702, the committee's note specifically
mentions Frye by stating that the proposed change "does not mandate a return
to the strictures of Frye v. United States."37 Thus, it appears that the changes
to the Federal Rules will at least acknowledge the Frye standard and attempt to
clarify Frye's applicability to Rule 702.
31 Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Sciennfic Evidence: Frye v. United
States, a Haif-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1980).
32 See Bernstein, supra note 6, at 120.
33 FED. R. EvID. 702 and advisory committee's notes; see Randolph N. Jonakait, The
Supreme Court, Plain Meaning, and the Changed Rules of Evidence, 68 TEX. L. REv. 745,
765-66 (1990).
34 See Bernstein, supra note 6, at 126 n.59 (quoting 3 . WEINsTEIN & M. BERGER,
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 702[03], at 702-36 (1990)).
35 Giannelli, supra note 31, at 1229.
36 Some circuits continue to follow Frye. E.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W.
3061 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1992) (No. 92-102); Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d
1106, 1115 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992);
United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 869
F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1989). However, other circuits have abandoned the Frye standard
in favor of the Federal Rules of Evidence. E.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786,
797 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1985). For further discussion, see STRONG, supra note 27, § 203, at
871-72; Bernstein, supra note 6, at 126; Black, supra note 28, at 601; and Steven M.
Egesdal, Note, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical
Evaluation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1769, 1769-70 (1986). The consensus among these commentators
seems to be that the majority of the courts accept Frye, at least in theory, while some
circuits remain undecided.
37 FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's notes (Prelim. Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence,
August 1991).
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More importantly, the United States Supreme Court appears poised to
address this issue by its recent grant of certiorari in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.3 8 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that an expert
witness' reanalyses of epidemiological studies provided an insufficient
foundation to allow the admission of expert testimony.39 The court relied on
Frye in reaching that conclusion.40 Consequently, it is likely that the Supreme
Court's opinion in that case will end the controversy concerning Frye's current
applicability to the admissibility of expert testimony.
B. Federal Rule of Evidence 702
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 currently provides: "If scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise."41 This rule also permits the testimony of an
expert regarding any scientific evidence that is helpful to the jury. This rule
incorporates the relevancy standard42 and goes further; it allows admission of
any expert testimony that will help explain other relevant evidence.43
Rule 702 is intentionally broad and generally viewed as liberalizing the
admissibility of scientific evidence.44 After the witness is qualified as an expert
by the court, the rule appears to leave any questions of reliability to the jury.
However, Rule 702 may not place all reliability determinations in the hands of
the jury; the court can exclude expert testimony when that testimony will not
be helpful to the jury.45 This can be the case, for example, when the testimony
is too time consuming or will confuse the jury. But can the court deem the
testimony as not helpful to the jury because the court considers the testimony
unreliable? Some courts have held that questions concerning the reliability of
the expert's testimony should go to weight rather than to admissibility. 46
However, the Third Circuit has stated that the helpfulness requirement in Rule
38 61 U.S.L.W. 3061 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1992) (No. 92-102).
39 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3061 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1992) (No. 92-102).
40 Id. at 1129-30.
41 FED. R. EviD. 702.
42 "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401.
43 Jonakait, supra note 33, at 765.
44 Bernstein, supra note 6, at 133.
45 Jonakait, supra note 33, at 768.
46 Loudermill v. Dow Chem. Co., 863 F.2d 566, 570 (8th Cir. 1988); International
Adhesive Coating v. Bolton Emerson Int'l, Inc., 851 F.2d 540, 545 (1st Cir. 1988); Dixon
v. International Harvester Co., 754 F.2d 573, 580 (5th Cir. 1985).
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702 "implies a quantum of reliability beyond that required to meet a standard
of bare logical relevance." 47 What that standard of reliability is remains
uncertain.
The August 1991 preliminary draft of the proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules of Evidence, once again, provides some clarification. The
proposed amendment to Rule 702 explicitly requires the testimony to be
"reasonably reliable" and to "substantially assist the trier of fact." 48 The
committee's note states that the rule requires the court to reject testimony that
either lacks significant support in the scientific community or is of only
marginal help to the factfinder. 49 The proposed change is still ambiguous
regarding the quantum of reliability required, but does give the court the
authority to assess "reasonable reliability" in making its determination of
admissibility.
C. Federal Rule of Evidence 703
Rule 703 permits an expert to base an opinion or inference on facts or data
perceived by the expert at or before the hearing, either by firsthand
observation, evidence at trial, or facts presented to the expert outside of the
courtroom.50 The rule goes on to state that the facts or data need not be
admissible if they are of a type reasonably relied upon by other experts in the
field.51 Thus, the rule allows the expert to rely on facts or data, even in the
form of inadmissible hearsay, if other experts would rely on that type of data in
forming an opinion.
Some courts have interpreted this rule differently, choosing to impose a
standard of minimum reliability upon the facts or data relied upon by the
47 United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1235 (3d Cir. 1985); see also In re Paoli
R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 916 F.2d 829, 857 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Downing and citing
DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 957 (3d Cir. 1990)), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
48 FED. R. EVID. 702 (Prelim. Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, August 1991) (emphasis added). The
proposal for Rule 702 is as follows:
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized information, in
the form of opinion or otherwise, may be permitted only if (1) the information is
reasonably reliable and will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, and (2) the witness is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to provide such testimony.
Id.
49 Id. at advisory committee's notes.
50 FED. R. EVID. 703 and advisory committee's notes.
51 Id.
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expert.52 The Fifth Circuit adopted this interpretation and stated that "Rule
703... requires courts to examine the reliability of these sources." 53 In
Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co.,54 the Fifth Circuit continued to examine
reliability as a function of Rule 703. The court stated that "[a]s a general rule,
questions relating to the bases and sources of an expert's opinion affect the
weight to be assigned that opinion rather than its
admissibility[;]... [however,] [i]f an opinion is fundamentally unsupported
then it offers no expert assistance to the jury. " 55 In this situation, the court
advocated a judicial determination of threshold reliability.56 In yet another
approach, the Third Circuit has stated that "[t]he proper inquiry is not what the
court deems reliable, but what experts in the relevant discipline deem
[reliable]. " 57 The opinion further required the district court to make a factual
inquiry as to what data experts in the field find reliable.58
The question of whether Rule 703 requires a judicial assessment of
reliability remains uncertain. The preliminary draft of the proposed changes to
the Federal Rules of Evidence does not address Rule 703.59 However, because
the proposed change to Rule 702 contains a reliability requirement for the
expert's information, 60 in the future courts may be able to assess reliability via
Rule 702 without having to look to Rule 703.
D. Federal Rule of Evidence 403
Rule 403 states "[allthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 61 The
Advisory Committee's note defines unfair prejudice as an "undue tendency to
52 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1245
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), a~fd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1234 (1988).
53 Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 1983).
54 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987).
55 Id. at 422; see also Hurst v. United States, 882 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir. 1989)
(holding that a trial court should exclude expert opinion only if so fundamentally
unsupported that it cannot help the factfinder).
56 Viterbo, 826 F.2d at 422.
57 In re Japanese Elec. Prods., 723 F.2d 238, 276 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
5 8 Id. at 277.
5 9 See FED. R. EVID. (Prelim. Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, August 1991).6 0 Id. at Rule 702.
6 1 FED. R. EVID. 403.
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suggest decision on an improper basis." 62 Rule 403 provides for judicial
scrutiny prior to the admission of otherwise relevant evidence. The rule is
significant for expert testimony because jurors have a tendency to over-rely on
expert opinions; 63 thus, the court must weigh this potential for prejudice
against the probative value of the expert testimony. The difficult aspect of the
application of Rule 403 is the court's consideration of the reliability of the
evidence in determining its probative value. Although reliability is a factor in
the probative value of expert testimony, who should determine reliability-the
court or the jury?
Some courts have used Rule 403 to exclude otherwise admissible expert
testimony. 64 In Viterbo, the court excluded expert testimony by using a
combination of Rule 703 and Rule 403.65 The court stated that the "lack of
reliable support may render [the evidence] more prejudicial than probative." 66
However in other cases, courts have stated that Rule 403 should be used
sparingly, and with caution.67
III. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S RECENT HISTORY REGARDING THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
The controversy concerning the judicial role in assessing the reliability of
expert testimony has had different outcomes in the various federal circuit
courts. 68 In the Fifth Circuit, the recent trend has been towards active judicial
review.69 In 1983, the Fifth Circuit stated that a trial court is required by Rule
703 to examine the reliability of the expert's sources of information upon
which the expert's opinion will be based.70 However, in a later case the court
stated that the district court should defer to the expert's view on the type of
62 Id. at advisory committee's notes.
63 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1256 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd on other grounds, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234
(1988).64 Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Coming Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir. 1986);
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1321 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1022 (1986); see also Anne S. Toker, Note, Adnitting Sdentific Evidence in Toxic
Tort Litigation, 15 HARV. ENvTL. L. REv. 165, 166-77 (1991).
65 Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987).
66 Id.
67 United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 862
(1979); see also DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941, 957 (3d Cir.
1990) (stating that Rule 403 is an unlikely basis for exclusion if testimony survives Rule 702
and Rule 703).
68 See infra text accompanying notes 142-65.
69 Plotkin, supra note 4, at 1266.
70 Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 505 (5th Cir. 1983).
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information typically relied upon by experts in the field.71 In 1985, the Fifth
Circuit applied a strict interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 to
exclude evidence that asbestos is carcinogenic, holding that the probative value
of the evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.72
The real explosion came in 1986, in In re Air Crash Disaster at New
Orleans.73 In this wrongful death action, the court disallowed the testimony of
an economist because this testimony was "so abusive of the known facts, and
so removed from any area of demonstrated expertise, as to provide no
reasonable basis [for the calculation of damages]. " 74 Judge Patrick
Higginbotham discussed the court's role in the admissibility of expert testimony
and stated that "it is time to take hold of expert testimony in federal trials." 75
Judge Higginbotham directed this statement toward appellate judges, warning
that although a deferential standard should be used, appellate judges must
address the decisions in which expert testimony was "simply tossed off to the
jury under a 'let it all in' philosophy." 76 Professor Gerald R. Powell has called
this ruling the start of the "backlash" to the proliferation of expert testimony
that came about with the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 77
The next major decision was Viterbo v. Dow Chemical Co.,7 8 in which the
court asked the question "whether it is so if an expert says it is So." 7 9 In this
toxic tort case the opinion of the plaintiff's expert was excluded under Rule 703
and 403. The court stated that the underlying data on which the expert based
the opinion was lacking in reliability and probative value, and granted
summary judgment in favor of the defendant.80 Thus, the court answered its
own question in the negative.81
In Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,82 parents of a child with
birth defects brought suit against a drug manufacturer, alleging that a
prescription drug taken during pregnancy had caused the child's birth defects. 83
The jury found for the plaintiffs, and the defendants unsuccessfully moved for a
71 Greenwood Utilities Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 1484, 1495 (5th
Cir. 1985).
72 Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1321 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986); see also Toker, supra note 64, at 168-75.
73 795 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1986).
74 Id. at 1235.
75 Id. at 1234.
76 Id.
77 Gary Taylor, Expert Witness Opinion Eyed, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 21, 1991, at 3, 35.
78 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1987).
79 Id. at 421.
80 Id. at 421-22.
81 See Plotkin, supra note 4, at 1266.
82 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), modified for clanfi cation, 884 F.2d 166, cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1046 (1990).
83 Id. at 308.
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judgment notwithstanding the verdict.8 4 On appeal, the court held that the
plaintiffs' expert's testimony was inadmissible and that the plaintiffs had not
shown evidence of causation.8 5 The court noted that judges must "evaluate the
reasoning process by which the experts connect data to their conclusions in
order for courts to consistently and rationally resolve the disputes before
them." 8 6 Thus, the court used active judicial scrutiny, rather than deference to
the jury, in reaching its conclusion.
The Fifth Circuit has continued to utilize active judicial scrutiny, recently
holding that a district court acted within its authority in evaluating the
reliability of experts;8 7 the testimony of an expert was properly excluded
because it was too speculative;88 and the testimony of an expert could be
excluded if his calculations were not supported by the record89 or he lacked the
proper training. 90 Christophersen has followed this line of cases, advocating
strict judicial scrutiny of expert testimony. 91
IV. EVALUATION OF CHRISTOPHERSEN
A. Christophersen's Four-Part Framework
Christophersen evaluated the admissibility of expert testimony by setting
forth a four-part test, requiring adherence to: (1) Federal Rule of Evidence 702;
(2) Federal Rule of Evidence 703; (3) the Frye test; and, if the first three
threshold tests are met, (4) evaluation under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.92
The court stated that all of these factors must be considered in questions of
admissibility of expert testimony.93
84 Id.
85 Id. at 312.
86 Id. at 310; see also Plotkin, supra note 4, at 1267; David A. Schlueter, Evidence:
Fifth Circuit Survey June, 1989-May, 1990, 22 TEX. TECH L. REv. 573, 598 (1991).87 Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 919 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1990).
88 Brown v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 919 F.2d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1990); see also
Benavides v. County of Wilson, 955 F.2d 968, 973 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 79
(1992).
89 Randolph v. Laeisz, 896 F.2d 964, 967 (5th Cir. 1990).
90 Sullivan v. Rowan Cos., 952 F.2d 141, 145 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Benavides,
955 F.2d at 973.
91 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en band) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
9 2 Id. at 1110.
93 Id.
1194 [Vol. 53:1185
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
1. Rule 702
Rule 702 governs the qualifications of an expert witness. 94 Although the
district court in (Ziristophersen did not base its disallowance of the expert's
testimony on Rule 702, the court did question the expert's qualifications. 95 The
fact that the expert was not an oncologist or pathologist, although he was an
M.D., bothered the court.96 The majority noted that the questioning of an
expert's qualifications does not stop simply because the expert has an M.D.;
the expert's opinion must assist the factfinder. 97 The majority also stated that
"the inquiry into the qualifications of an expert should not be a substitute for
scrutinizing an expert's reasoning or methodology." 98
In a concurring opinion, Judge Clark disagreed with the majority and
pointed out that Rule 702 does not require the expert's opinion to assist the
factfinder, but only requires that the expert's specialized knowledge assist the
factfinder to understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue.99 Judge Clark
further stated that the witness was qualified to testify as an expert under Rule
702.1o
The court did not discuss whether Rule 702 requires the expert testimony
to be reliable in order to assist the factfinder. As previously stated, this issue is
handled differently by various courts. 10 1 Although currently there is not a
definitive answer to this question, the proposed amendment to Rule 702 would
end the controversy because it has an explicit reliability requirement. 10 2
2. Rule 703
Rule 703 addresses the requirements for the facts or data relied upon by the
expert in forming an opinion, allowing an expert to rely upon inadmissible
sources of facts or data.' 03 The expert on Christophersen based his opinion on
information from the affidavit of a Marathon employee. 104 The court
determined that the affidavit was inaccurate and incomplete; hence, the source
94 FED. R. EviD. 702.
95 Christophersen, 939 F.2d at 1112.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1110.
99 Id. at 1116-17 (Clark, I., concurring); FED. R. EVID. 702.
100 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1116-17 (5th Cir. 1991)
(en banc) (Clark, J., concurring), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
101 See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
102 FED. R. EVID. 702. (Prelim. Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, August 1991).
103 FED. R. EVID. 703.
104 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1113 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
bane) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
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of the expert's opinion was unreliable.' 0 5 The court quoted Viterbo and stated
that although the general rule is that questions regarding the scientific bases of
an expert's opinion affect the weight of the opinion rather than admissibility,
this general rule yields when "the source upon which an expert's opinion relies
is of such little weight... that [the] testimony would not actually assist the
jury. ... "106 The majority went on to state that although Rule 703 is directed
towards allowing an expert to base his opinion on inadmissible sources, the
"inquiry into the types of facts and data underlying an expert's testimony is not
limited to the admissibility of that data." 10 7 The majority followed the Fifth
Circuit precedent on this issue. 10 8
Judge Clark, in his concurrence, joined with the dissent to argue that the
majority ignored the plain words and the plain meaning of Rule 703.109 Judge
Clark opined that Viterbo was decided wrongly, and that the Fifth Circuit has
continued to follow this "erroneous construction." 10 The basis of Judge
Clark's opinion was that Rule 703 only looks to the facts and data that the
expert relies upon."' If these facts and data are admissible, Rule 703 does not
authorize exclusion of expert testimony.112 If these facts and data are not
admissible, the court looks to the reliability of these types of facts and data.1 13
If the reliability requirement is met, Rule 703 does not authorize exclusion.114
If it is not met, the court can exclude the testimony." 5 This reliability
requirement is met if similar experts use the same type of facts and data to form
an opinion; the rule does not address the expert's "methodology. " 116 Judge
Clark noted that the district court did not determine the admissibility of the
facts and data used by the expert, and stated that these facts and data should
have been considered admissible. 1 7 Thus, Rule 703 could not authorize
exclusion of this evidence.
Judge Clark and the dissent appear to be interpreting Rule 703 correctly,
despite the Fifth Circuit's decisions that support the majority opinion. Rule 703
is not a rule of exclusion, but simply a means of admitting expert testimony
that is based on inadmissible facts and data. The Fifth Circuit has stretched the
language of Rule 703 to construe a reliability requirement in all circumstances;
105 Id.
106 Id. (quoting Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987)).
107 Id. at 1114.
108 See supra notes 68-91 and accompanying text.
109 ahristophersen, 939 F.2d at 1117 (Clark, J., concurring).
110 Id. at 1118.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
1 16 Id.
117 Id. at 1119.
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the rule requires the facts and data to be reliable only when they are in the form
of inadmissible evidence. Moreover, Rule 703 deals with the type of facts and
data relied upon by experts in the field." 8 An affidavit of a fellow employee is
the type of facts and data an expert would rely on in this situation. The Fifth
Circuit has looked well beyond the type of facts and data and into the issue of
reliability itself. The jury, and not the court, should conduct this scrutiny into
reliability. The fact that the purpose of Rule 703 was to broaden the universe of
admissible expert testimony supports this interpretation." 9
3. The Frye Test
The Frye "general acceptance" test has been interpreted and regarded very
differently by different courts. 120 The Fifth Circuit has limited the doctrine to
the admissibility of "novel scientific evidence." 121 However, the majority
opinion of Christophersen utilized the Frye test, and defined it as "whether the
methodology or reasoning that the expert uses to connect the facts to his
conclusion is generally accepted within the relevant scientific community." 22
The majority felt that this test was not met because the expert's methodology
was flawed. The expert presumed-without scientific foundation-that because
exposure to nickel and cadmium was associated with lung cancer, that exposure
was also associated with colon cancer. 123 The majority determined that this
presumption invalidated the expert's methodology.
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Reavley criticized the majority's liberal
reading of Frye, noting that "[n]ow the Fifth Circuit, without precedent,
reaches beyond novel device or technique and subjects expert reasoning to
judge-determined reliability. "124
Judge Clark agreed with the dissent and noted that Frye did not survive the
Federal Rules of Evidence. 125 Judge Clark stated that even if the Frye test had
survived, it would not be applicable in diversity cases under the Erie
doctrine126 and is not a good rule that the court should adopt. 127
The dissent is correct in concluding that the majority devised its own
reading of Frye. The majority has confused the meaning of Frye by suggesting
118 FED. R. EvID. 703.
119 FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's notes.
120 See supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
121 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1133 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
122 Id. at 1115.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1132 (Reavley, ., dissenting).
125 Id. at 1120 (Clark, J., concurring).
126 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
127 Id.
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that it imposes a judicial scrutiny of an expert's methodology. This is a very
liberal reading of the case, which seems particularly inappropriate in light of
the uncertain status of Frye following the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Unless the Supreme Court holds otherwise, 128 it is highly unlikely
that the Frye test has survived the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
4. Rule 403
Rule 403 allows the court to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if "its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice." 129 The majority opinion in Christophersen did not discuss Rule
403, stating that it was unnecessary because the testimony did not meet the
standards of either Rule 703 or the Frye test. 130 In setting up its four-part test,
the majority distinguished Rule 403 from the other factors, stating that Rule
702, Rule 703, and Frye were threshold requirements while Rule 403 was an
"overlay." 131 The majority considered Rule 403 to be a final tool for judicial
exclusion of otherwise admissible testimony. 132
In his concurrence, Judge Clark concluded that the expert testimony should
be excluded solely under Rule 403.133 Judge Clark stated that the fact that a
witness is deemed an expert has a great effect on a jury and would "certainly
be an improper basis for a jury's decision." 134 Moreover, Judge Clark felt that
"[a]n analysis of probity versus unfair prejudice almost always depends to
some extent on facts."' 35 Judge Clark concluded his discussion of Rule 403 by
pointing out that there was not manifest error in the district court's holding that
the probative value of the expert testimony was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice. 136
In the dissent, Judge Reavley disagreed with this assessment and stated that
the judge's opinion of the contested evidence should not determine the
reliability or relative merit of the evidence.' 37 Judge Reavley concluded that
exclusion of the testimony based on Rule 403 was just as erroneous as
excluding the testimony on the basis of either Rule 703 or Frye.138
128 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 61 U.S.L.W. 3061 (U.S. Oct. 13,
1992) (No. 92-102).12 9 FED. R. EvID. 403.
130 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1116 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
bane) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
131 Id. at 1110.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1120 (Clark, J., concurring).
134 Id.
135 Id. at 1121.
136 Id. at 1121-22.
13 7 Id. at 1135 (Reavley, I., dissenting).
138 Id.
1198 [Vol. 53:1185
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
The real difficulty in the application of Rule 403 is the scrutiny into the
reliability required to determine the probative value of the evidence. There is
not a clear answer to the question of who should conduct this scrutiny-the
judge or the jury. While the judge must assess the probative value of the
evidence, this assessment should not include taking questions of reliability
away from the jury. The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 403 do not
provide any guidance as to how far the judge should go in the determination of
probative value.139 Additionally, the proposed changes to the Federal Rules do
not address Rule 403.140 Thus, for the time being, this question remains
unanswered. Rule 403 is in place to allow the judge one final look at the
contested evidence prior to determining admissibility in order to prevent unfair
prejudice. However, there is a presumption of admissibility of relevant
evidence under the Federal Rules; 141 thus, the judge should leave truly
contested questions of reliability to the jury.
B. Comparing Christophersen to other Federal Circuit Decisions
1. Change in the D. C. Circuit
The D.C. Circuit advocated a passive approach to the judicial scrutiny of
expert testimony in its 1984 decision in Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. 142 In
this toxic tort case, the court reviewed the denial of the defendant's motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The motion was based upon the alleged
failure of the plaintiff's expert to prove that defendant's chemical was the cause
of the plaintiff's illness. The court affirmed the denial of the motion, holding
that the jury was competent to weigh the credibility of expert testimony. 143 The
court stated that when the evidence consists of a "battle of the experts" the jury
must act as the factfinder. 144 Thus, the Ferebee court concluded that expert
testimony in toxic tort cases should be given only minimal judicial scrutiny. 145
However, the D.C. Circuit decided to take a more active judicial role in its
1988 decision in Richardson ex rel. Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. 146
In that case, the court had to determine whether the drug Bendectin had caused
the plaintiff's birth defects. The court rejected the plaintiff's expert based on
139 See FED. R. EvID. 403 advisory committee's notes.
140 See FED. R. EvID. (Prelim. Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, August 1991).
141 See FED. R. EVID. 402.
142 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
143 Id. at 1534.
144 Id.; see also Plotkin, supra note 4, at 1265.
145 Plotkin, supra note 4, at 1265.
146 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 882 (1989).
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Rule 703,147 concluding that the judge needed to maintain control over the
evidence presented to the jury. 148 The D.C. Circuit did not overrule Ferebee,
but distinguished it by limiting its holding to those cases in which the scientific
evidence is novel, or "at the frontier of current medical... inquiry." 149 The
D.C. Circuit felt that the issue presented in Richardson was established in the
medical community, and thus subject to strict judicial scrutiny. °50 This about
face in the D.C. Circuit is further evidence of the trend towards stricter judicial
control of expert testimony.
2. Direct Conflict with the Third Circuit
The Third Circuit recently decided a case with an expert testimony issue
similar to that in Christophersen. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation'5' was
a consolidation of suits brought by thirty-eight persons who either worked or
lived near a rail yard. The plaintiffs sought damages because of injuries
allegedly caused by exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs).152 The
Third Circuit reviewed a district court's decision to grant summary judgment
based on the exclusion of plaintiffs' expert opinion testimony. The district court
used a combination of Rule 702, Rule 703, and Rule 403 to exclude the
evidence.1 53 The Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court,
holding that the court erred in the exclusion of the expert opinion testimony.' 54
The Third Circuit stated that its "scrutiny of the [evidentiary]
rulings... focus[ed] not only upon their legal foundations, but also on the
procedures by which they were made and the adequacy of their
articulation. " 155 The Paoli court reversed the evidentiary exclusions because
the district court failed to follow protocols of Rule 702 and Rule 703,156
applied too stringent a standard to the qualification of experts under Rule
14 7 Id. at 829.
148 Id.; see also Plotldn, supra note 4, at 1267.
149 Richardson, 857 F.2d at 832.
150 Id.
151 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991). The Paoli
court favorably cited the Third Circuit's earlier decision in DeLuca v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that an expert's opinion could
not be excluded merely because the weight of scientific evidence was against him; and
specifically rejecting the Frye standard). Paoli, 916 F.2d at 854-58.
152 Id. at 835.
153 Id. at 853.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 835-36.
156 Id. at 836.
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702,157 failed to articulate adequately what facts it relied upon in making its
legal determination, 158 and misapplied Rule 403.159
Paoli is factually similar to Christophersen. In both cases the appellate
courts were called upon to review a district court's grant of summary judgment
because of the exclusion of the plaintiff's expert opinion testimony. In both
cases, the district courts utilized strict judicial scrutiny of the expert opinion
testimony and based their exclusions of the testimony on unreliability. While
the Third Circuit in Paoli rejected this approach and reversed the summary
judgment, the Fifth Circuit in Christophersen endorsed this approach and
affirmed the summary judgment. The United States Supreme Court denied
petitions for certiorari in both Paoli60 and Christophersen. 161
However, Justice White, in his dissent to the denial of certiorari in
Cliristophersen, encouraged the Supreme Court to offer direction to the lower
courts by deciding a case regarding the admission of expert testimony, so as to
resolve the direct conflict that currently exists among the circuit courts. 162
Justice White acknowledged that the courts are divided and stated that
"[b]ecause this is an important recurring issue, [the Supreme Court] should
grant certiorari" 163 The Supreme Court has apparently heeded Justice White's
advice by recently granting certiorari in a case dealing with the exclusion of
expert testimony under the Frye standard. 164 Although Frye is only one aspect
of the expert testimony conflict, the Supreme Court's clarification of Frye's
current applicability, along with the possible amendments to the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 165 should put an end to this conflict.
V. TRENDS TOWARDS AcrivE JUDICIAL REVIEW
As Judge Higginbotham articulated, courts increasingly feel that "[i]t is
time to take hold of expert testimony." 166 Perhaps because of the flood of
expert testimony in today's trials and the relatively flexible standards of
admissibility of the Federal Rules of Evidence, courts are searching for ways to
take control of expert testimony. This trend towards stricter judicial control of
expert testimony is evidenced in several proposed changes.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 854.
159 Id. at 859.
160 General Elec. Co. v. Knight, 111 S. Ct. 1584 (1991).
161 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
162 Id. at 1281 (White, ., dissenting).
163 Id.
164 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3061 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1992) (No. 92-102).
165 FED. R. EVID. (Prelim. Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, August 1991).166 In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, 795 F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986).
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A. Proposed Changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence
The August 1991 Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Changes to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence
recommended a change to Rule 702 that will help judges better control the
admissibility of expert testimony. This change will require the expert's opinion
to be "reasonably reliable" in order to be admissible.167 This revision is
intended to limit the use, but increase the reliability, of expert opinion
testimony.168
B. Agenda for Cvil Refonn in America
A report from the President's Council on Competitiveness has addressed
the problem of expert witness testimony. 169 The report stated that "[a]n area of
the law particularly ripe for reform is expert witness practice." 170 The report
continued by stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence have eliminated many
of the common-law restrictions on the use of expert witnesses. This elimination
has resulted in the "uncontrolled use of expert witnesses" and "allowed junk
science to tarnish the legal process."' 17 1
The expert evidence reform suggested in the report recommends, in part,
amending Federal Rule of Evidence 702.172 The amendments to Rule 702
would consist of a requirement that expert testimony be based on "widely
accepted" theories, a ban on contingency fee payments for expert witnesses,
and an express requirement that courts determine that the expert is qualified in
his or her field. 173 Additionally, the report recommends that Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 26 be amended to require additional disclosure from expert
witnesses in discovery. 174 It should be noted that the proposed changes to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 includes this amendment suggested by the
Council on Competitiveness. 175
167 FED. R. EvID. 702 (Prelim. Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, August 1991).
168 Id. at advisory committee's notes.
169 A Report from the President's Council on Competitiveness, Agenda for Gvil
Justice Reform in America, August 1991.17 0 Id. at4.
171 Id.
17 2 Id. at 21.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2) (Prelim. Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, August 1991).
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C. American Law Institute's Proposals
The dissent in Christophersen discussed methods of taking control of
expert testimony without taking over.1 76 Judge Reavley stated that the
American Law Institute is presently considering a proposal for "Blue Ribbon
Science Panels" and a "Federal Science Board" to assist courts in the matter of
scientific questions. 177 The dissent advocated the use of presently available
methods, such as appointing special masters, to gain control of expert
testimony without distorting the Federal Rules of Evidence. 178
These recommendations are evidence of the trend towards tighter judicial
control of expert testimony. While these recommendations are not ideal, they
do illustrate that an awareness of the problems associated with the admissibility
of expert testimony exists and that solutions are actively being sought.
VI. CONCLUSION
The proliferation of "expert" testimony is threatening the integrity of legal
proceedings, and many courts are now becoming justifiably concerned about
the reliability of such testimony. The crux of this issue is whether the court
should make an initial reliability determination of expert testimony or
completely defer to the jury on this issue. The courts seem to be struggling
with finding the authority to empower themselves to make this threshold
reliability determination. However, at present, an adequate basis for this type
of judicial control does not exist.
Misapplication of the Federal Rules of Evidence is not the proper solution.
The Christophersen majority misapplied Rule 702 and Rule 703 to assert
control over the reliability determination. In addition, the court relied on the
Frye doctrine to determine the reliability of the testimony. Unless the Supreme
Court holds otherwise, it seems unlikely that Frye has survived the enactment
of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
By not admitting this testimony, the Fifth Circuit impermissibly usurped
the jury's role in determining the reliability of evidence. The present Federal
Rules of Evidence do not permit this; in fact, the rules have a strong
presumption in favor of admissibility. No matter how well-intentioned, the
courts cannot bend the Federal Rules to meet their objectives.
The proposed changes to the Federal Rules are a step in the right direction.
The proposed change to Rule 702 would allow courts to make a threshold
determination of "reasonable reliability" prior to admitting expert testimony.
176 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1129 (5th Cir. 1991) (en
bane) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
177 Id.178 Id.
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The jury would then make all further reliability assessments. This threshold
determination is not overly intrusive into the jury's province and would seem to
represent a reasonable balancing of the court's and jury's roles. Because of the
unique nature of expert testimony, the court must be able to assert a modest
degree of control to ensure a minimum of reliability.
The proposed changes to Rule 702 are not perfect; this is not a bright-line
test. If the proposed changes were enacted, courts would still have difficulty
interpreting just what constitutes "reasonable reliability." Nonetheless, the
changes would provide the courts with the requisite authority to make a
threshold judicial determination of reliability. However, until the Federal Rules
change, courts have little latitude and should defer to the jury on all questions
of reliability.
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